



and acceptance by policy makers of the political, economic and security realities of the Turkish situation, in our opinion, came about only well after the President's decision, in part as a result of both informal and official finished intelligence contributions by this Agency, some of which undoubtedly the BNDD could have produced if it had an experienced intelligence unit. Within his own organization, Mr. Ingersoll has had only Mr. John Parker, his special assistant, to turn to for finished intelligence production. But Mr. Parker has been without a staff, and the responsibilities that have been laid upon him are clearly impossible for one person, however strong, to fulfill over the long term.

4. On 25 May 1978 Mr. Ingersoll asked whether CIA would "survey" BNDD's intelligence effort and suggest how it might be improved. Without committing CIA, we asked that his principal advisers brief us in sufficient detail to permit us to present a more specific request to the DCI for his approval.

5. These briefings followed and disclosed that BNDD does not seek an in-depth study or systems analysis. What it desires is informal guidance from CIA on how to put together a compact, effective intelligence analysis and production staff, responsive to all the director's programs and to his priorities. It sees this staff as assuming a coordination and requirements role. It recognizes that BNDD will continue to depend heavily on collectors such as State and CIA for information it needs for negotiations and operations abroad.

6. Mr. Ingersoll has already selected Mr. Parker as his new intelligence chief, and has authorized him to recruit his own staff. Mr. Parker is a capable man who appreciates the extensive intelligence support so far given by CIA and will be responsive to whatever suggestions CIA makes to improve his staff and function. He has made it clear that, from his point of view, an objective CIA survey of BNDD's intelligence effort would be helpful not only to accomplish the ends outlined above but also to overcome resistance to change within BNDD that tends to block his efforts to acquire sufficient resources and an effective staff.

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7. CIA participation in the survey desired by BNDO would help cement our relations with it, which are good and worth preserving. In addition, if BNDO is able with our guidance to construct its own effectively operating intelligence unit, CIA might eventually be relieved of the burden of producing certain types of finished intelligence for it.

8. With your approval, we would propose to advise Mr. Ingersoll that CIA would react favorably to a formal request to conduct the survey described above, provided that such a request came, either in writing or by telephone, from the Attorney General. Our nominee for the task would be [redacted]. He would be instructed to work informally with BNDO senior officers, probably for a period of no longer than 30 days beginning on a date to be mutually arranged, letting BNDO draw from his knowledge and wisdom the solutions that fit its particular problems. In view of the unusual and delicate nature of this mission, we believe that it would be in the interest of both services to avoid a formal and bureaucratic exchange.

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Signed: [redacted]25X1  
JAMES ANGLERON  
Chief, CT Staff

Signed [redacted]

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25X1  
Chief, Production Staff, OCT

CONCOR:

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[redacted] 1 SEP  
1970

Deputy Director for Plans

Date

25X1  
[redacted] 2 SEP 1970

Wm's Deputy Director for Intelligence

Date

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Recommendation contained in paragraph 8 is APPROVED.  
01 Aug 5 932  
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Director of Central Intelligence

Date

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